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Tax neutrality towards alternative financing instruments for corporate investment is a 
ubiquitous demand in the political debate. At the same time, the literature is surprisingly silent 
about the magnitude of possible efficiency costs of a departure from tax neutrality. Against 
this background, the present paper discusses the theory of capital structure and provides back-
of-the-envelope calculations of the possible efficiency cost of a tax distortion of the debt-
equity decision. 
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1. Introduction  
 
“Financial policy decisions often amount to choosing the optimal trade-off between 
distortions to financial policy and the tax benefits such distortions generate” (Auerbach 2002, 
p. 1254). Indeed, in countries with a progressive personal income tax rate on capital income, 
full financial neutrality may be next to impossible. At the same time, tax neutrality with 
respect to the debt-equity choice is one of the most frequent demands in discussions about 
corporate tax reforms.  
A part of the economic literature strongly discounts the efficiency cost of tax-induced 
financial distortions. Proponents of the new view of capital taxation often regard financing 
flexibility as a buffer that prevents tax discrimination from producing harmful real economic 
distortions (Sinn 1987, pp. 140 et sqq.). This idea corresponds with the result by Modigliani 
and Miller (1958) that – in the absence of taxes and costs of bankruptcy and with perfect 
markets – investors are indifferent to the capital structure. 
While the interpretation above considers a corporation’s financing flexibility as a 
buffer for real economic distortions, the finance literature for a long time has contested the 
idea of financial flexibility. This has led Stewart Myers (1984), in his presidential address to 
the American Finance Association, to say, "I know of no study clearly demonstrating that a 
firm’s tax status has predictable, material effects on its debt policy. I think the wait for such a 
study will be protracted."
1 
Uncertainty about the empirical elasticity of the capital structure with regard to fiscal 
distortions might explain why public-finance scholars have more often scrutinized the 
consequences of the sensitivity than the possible amount of efficiency loss that results from a 
                                                 
1 Similar doubts about fiscal distortion with regard to corporate financing strategies were raised before by the 
Nobel laureate Merton Miller (1977, p. 264): "…the debt/asset ratio of the typical nonfinancial corporation in the 
1950’s was little different from that of the 1920’s despite the fact that tax rates had quintupled – from 10 and 11 
percent in the 1920’s to 52 percent in the 1950’s."   2
fiscal distortion.
2 In this paper we will make some efforts at presenting estimates of tax 
distortions as they may be calculated from recent empirical studies.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers a discussion of 
the standard theories on the capital structure. Section 3 elaborates on the tax advantages of 
different sources of finance. Section 4 reports on the growing literature that provides 
empirical estimates of tax effects on debt financing. In Section 5, we use the theoretical model 
of Section 3 and the empirical results contained in Section 4 to attach numbers to the welfare 
costs of tax-distorted financing decisions. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Theories of capital structure: a brief outline 
 
2.1 The irrelevance hypothesis 
 
The starting point of the modern theory of corporate finance is Modigliani and Miller 
(1958). Their insight is as simple as it was surprising at its time: in the absence of taxes and 
costs of bankruptcy and with perfect capital markets, the value of a corporation will be 
independent of the debt-asset ratio. The intuition of this result is that the value of a 
corporation depends on the cash flow produced and what total risk this cash flow implies, and 
not on how this cash flow is split into dividends versus interest.  
Capital structure seems not to be irrelevant in practice. If in a world without taxes the 
capital structure were irrelevant, then a small tax preference for debt over equity would yield 
a departure from Modigliani and Miller’s irrelevance and would provide for a corner solution 
of capital structure with full debt financing, which is hardly observed in reality. Certainly, 
nontax factors of capital structure must come into play.  
 
 
                                                 
2 The question of the amount of potential efficiency costs remains open in a new voluminous handbook 
(Auerbach 2002) and an extensive survey by Graham (2003).     3
2.2 The trade-off theory 
If indeed the tax system provides a preference for debt,
  other violations of the 
assumption by Modigliani and Miller may avoid a corner solution.
3
   A straightforward 
possibility is that the assumption of zero bankruptcy cost is too heroic. Since a high debt-asset 
ratio increases the probability of a bankruptcy, a corporation that internalizes part of this cost 
may forgo some of the benefit of interest deductibility by also using equity to avoid the cost 
of bankruptcy and also the cost of financial distress.  
  Asymmetric information on capital markets may add to the problems of excessive 
debt. Equity holders carry the whole investment costs, but, because of the increased 
repayment probability for debt, they do not receive the whole expected profits if they extend 
their investment. This leads to potential efficiency costs, which could be avoided by a 
reduction of debt. The problems that arise from a conflict of interest between equity and debt 
holders should be comparatively small if a corporation has sufficient suitable collateral that 
limits the risk of creditors in case of a default (Scott, 1977), and empirical support for this has 
been provided for example by Dhaliwal, Trezevant, and Wang (1992). 
 
2.3 The free-cash-flow hypothesis 
The problem of managerial entrenchment is pervasive in the literature of corporate 
governance. If managers have better information about the real cost of business and the profit 
opportunities than shareholders, then managers may fail to maximize shareholder value but 
follow their own goals. Shareholder monitoring to curb managers may be inefficiently low if 
highly diversified ownership leads to free riding by owners. In such a situation, debt may have 
a nontax advantage over equity (Jensen, 1986). This advantage results because debt is a 
disciplining device for management. Projects or corporations that are debt-financed must at 
least yield a return that covers the fixed interest to stay solvent. The need to serve the interest   4
on debt reduces the free cash flow and reduces the discretion of managers to pursue projects 
that foster their own interest (e.g., empire building) but not those of the shareholders. 
  One potential problem with the disciplinary role of a high debt-equity ratio is its 
implementation: in the absence of shareholders' monitoring, the disciplinary effect of debt 
may indeed be an argument for managers to avoid debt and prefer retention policies (Myers, 
2001). Conversely, Zwiebel (1996) and Grossman and Hart (1982) emphasize the role of 
potential takeovers as a mechanism that may urge managers to issue debt even in the absence 
of powerful shareholders.  
 
2.4 The pecking-order hypothesis 
While the free-cash-flow hypothesis addresses a moral hazard problem, the pecking-
order theory by Myers and Majluf (1984) is based on an adverse-selection model. It assumes a 
corporation that acts in the best interest of existing shareholders and therefore will find it 
optimal (from the point of view of existing shareholders) to issue shares if the market 
valuation is too high in the light of private management information. Hence, in the case of 
information asymmetries, the share market will tend to interpret new share issues as a signal 
of overvaluation, and new share issues will lead to a price decrease, which is to be avoided in 
the interest of existing shareholders. 
  Given that valuation problems of debt are less severe than those of equity, the share 
price decrease following an issue is less pronounced for debt than for equity. Therefore the 
pecking-order theory predicts that firms will use internal financing sources first and revert to 
external debt and, even more reluctantly, to new equity only after internal sources of finance 
have been exhausted. 
                                                                                                                                                         
3 It should be noted that the sole consideration of corporate tax and tax deductibility of interest is not sufficient 
for a tax preference for debt financing. See Section 3.   5
While there are several empirical studies that find some evidence in favor of the 
pecking-order hypothesis,
4 we will in the following abstract from it. The main reason is that it 
rather is a theory of financing tactics than a theory of the overall debt-equity choice, but the 
latter is required to arrive at welfare implications of a distorted debt-equity ratio.    
 
3. Trade-off theory and taxes: a basic synthesis 
This section extends the theory of tax preferences, as developed by King (1977), King 
and Fullerton (1984), and Sinn (1987), by imposing a well-defined optimal debt-asset ratio in 
the absence of tax considerations. This optimal debt-asset ratio may arise from a combination 
of the theoretical arguments above. According to the trade-off theory bankruptcy costs are an 
argument for a low debt ratio. The free-cash-flow hypothesis finds it optimal (from the point 
of view of existing shareholders) to have a high debt ratio to reduce the free cash flow and the 
discretion of managers to pursue non-profit-maximizing behavior.  
To describe the tax system, let tp denote the shareholders’ tax rate on personal interest 
income, td their tax rate on dividend payments, and c their effective capital gains tax rate.
5 Θ 
characterizes the type of the corporate tax system: Θ = 1 represents a classical system without 
imputation of corporate tax on the personal level, and Θ > 1 if an imputation credit is 
available. More precisely, Θ captures the amount of the dividend payment before personal 
income tax, if a corporation wants to distribute a profit of one euro after corporate taxation. 
Now, consider an investor who has to decide between holding and selling her shares.
6 
She is indifferent if the net-of-tax dividends and the capital gains compensate her for the 
opportunity costs, which arise because she could sell the shares at the going market value. 
Omitting time subscripts, we obtain  
                                                 
4 See Dierkens (1991), D’Mello and Ferris (2000), Eckbo (1996), or Shyam-Sunder (1991).  
5 Since usually tax systems tax realized rather than accrued capital gains, the longer the holding period, the larger 
the difference between effective and nominal rates. Typical effective tax rates on capital gains may be in the 
range of half the nominal rates (cf. King, 1977, chapter 3).   6
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V captures the going market value, 
.
V represents its change over time, i is the interest rate on 
investment in the capital markets, and D represents corporate dividend payments that are paid 
from after-tax profits. Following the new view of capital income taxation, we assume a 
mature, dividend-paying corporation. Let Q be the new investment of a shareholder in the 
company. Integrating 
.
V forward over time, setting the integration constant to zero, and 
assuming a constant market rate of interest yields the current market value as follows:
7 
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Since we are interested in the cost of financial distortions rather than in the distortion of 
overall investment, there is no loss in assuming that capital does not depreciate, net 
investment is zero, and the capital stock is constant and standardized to unity. Thus dividends 
paid out by the corporation may be financed by the current earnings net of interest and tax, by 
a change in debt, or by new issues: 
(3)                  . ] ) ( )[ 1 (
.
Q B iB K f t D u + + Ψ − − − =  
 
In equation (3), the corporate tax rate is denoted by tu, the function Ψ captures the nontax 
costs of a tax-distorted capital structure, and f(K) is the cash flow of real capital K. Since the 
capital stock is unity, B captures not only the amount of debt but also the debt-asset ratio. The 
costs of capital-structure distortions arise when the actual real debt-asset ratio B departs from 
the optimal ratio B*: 
                                                                                                                                                         
6 See Sinn (1987, chapter 3).   7
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In the following, it is assumed that the convex costs of the distorted debt-asset ratio 
provide an inner solution for the debt ratio.  
Given a fixed amount of total assets, the only flow of motion is given by changes in 
debt: 
 (5)                b B =
.
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Ignoring the nonnegativity constraints, the current value Hamiltonian is given by   
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where π = f(1). From the shareholder's point of view, λB captures the (negative) shadow value 
of a marginal unit of debt that a corporation owes to its creditors. On the basis of the 
Hamiltonian, the influence of restructuring corporate finance on the corporate value can be 
shown. An increase in new issues and a simultaneous increase in dividend payments that does 
not touch the basis of financing are given by   
 (7)   1 / 1
) 1 ( − = ∂ ∂ −
− Θ
c
td Q H . 
Since realistically c < td, dividend payments and the repatriation through new issues are only 
attractive if an imputation system provides a Θ that is sufficiently high. If a full imputation 
system is implemented with Θ = 1/(1 – tu), c > 0 and tu = td distribution of company profits 
combined with an issue of new shares will be tax efficient.  
   As derived in equation (7), one should notice that, depending on the sign of Θ (1 – td) 
(1 – tu) – (1 – c) (1 – tu), one of the two kinds of equity strictly dominates the other, thus 
leading to corner solutions in the choice of equity type (even as an interior debt-asset ratio 
prevails). If the tax burden on distributed profits, as measured by 1 – Θ (1 – td) (1 – tu), is 
                                                                                                                                                         
7 To simplify matters, the market rate of interest i is assumed to be constant. The integration constant is set to 
zero.     8
higher than the tax burden on retained profits, as measured by 1 – (1 – c)(1 – tu), then ∂H / ∂Q 
< 0 applies and new issues of shares will decrease the value of the corporation. In the reversed 
situation it is optimal to distribute all the profits as dividends and to compensate by issuing 
new equity. We will treat these cases in turn.  
 
Case A: Equity vs. debt if retentions dominate new issues 
First, consider the influence of taxes on the leverage in case equity is obtained through 
retentions. The advantage of a marginal increase in debt can be derived from the Hamiltonian:  
 (8)  B c
td b H λ + = ∂ ∂ −
− Θ
1
) 1 ( / . 
 
If the convex costs of a deviation from the optimal debt level B* lead to an inner solution of 
the optimal debt level, we obtain  
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t
B
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Another optimality constraint is given by the canonical equation of the Hamiltonian (6): 
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which can be rewritten using equations (6), (9) and the steady-state condition   0 = λ B & : 
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The sign on the left-hand side indicates the direction of the deviation from the debt 
level B*, which would be optimal in the absence of taxes. In consideration of (4) we get  




















Whether taxation favors retained profits or debt depends on whether the effective tax 
rate on household savings is higher or lower than the effective tax rate on corporate returns. If   9
a corporation distributes its profits and the shareholder saves these funds privately, she will 
receive i(1 − tp) as an interest payment after personal tax. If a corporation saves, then the 
cumulated tax burden is received from the shareholders’ capital gains taxes and the corporate 
tax, and the net-of-tax return equals i (1 – tu) (1 – c).  The tax burden on dividend payment, 
which is captured by the variables Θ and td, turns out to be irrelevant in the arbitrage 
calculation, because, with constant tax rates, it is independent of whether a dividend is paid 
today or tomorrow and cannot be avoided.
8 Ceteris paribus, a higher corporate tax rate will 
tend to shift the financial preference towards debt.  
 
Case B: Equity vs. debt if new issues dominate retained earnings 
Although empirically, retained earnings seem to be quantitatively more important than new 
issues for mature firms, it is conceivable to have a tax system in which new shares are tax-
favored over retentions (see equation (7)). In this case, a marginal financial redeployment 
from equity to debt leads to a zero effect on the company value in an inner financing solution:  
 (13)   1 0 1 / / − = ⇒ = + = ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ B B Q H b H λ λ . 
 
Given the canonical equation (10) and the steady-state condition  B λ &  = 0, we obtain 
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Hence, from the assumption (4) the following condition holds:  
 




















Again, the effective tax rate on private savings and corporate tax returns is decisive. The 
former is simply given by tp , while the latter equals 1 – Θ (1 – td) (1 – tu). Unlike in the case 
of comparing retentions with debt, the taxation of dividends, as captured by  Θ(1 – td), is 
                                                 
8 See King (1977), King and Fullerton (1984), Sinn (1987).   10
relevant for the financial preferences, as the tax burden on distributed profits can now be 
omitted by reducing new equity and increasing the use of debt. As in case A, a higher 
corporate tax rate on retentions, tu, tends to shift the financial preference towards debt.  
 
 
4. Taxes and the debt-equity ratio: empirical results 
4.1. Exploiting differences in nondebt tax shields  
As shown in Section 3, an increased corporate tax rate should increase the advantage 
of debt and lead to larger leverage. A fundamental problem in empirically identifying this 
effect is that often all corporations in an economy are subject to the same corporate tax rate tu. 
Usually, the nominal corporate tax rate is the same for all corporations in the same country, 
and the variation over time is often very small.
9 
A possible way out was suggested by DeAngelo and Masulis (1980). They argued that 
tax advantage of debt should be highest for firms that, because of other deductions like loss 
carryforwards or investment tax credits, may have difficulties in using all debt shields. Thus, 
one should expect a substitution effect between investment-related tax relief and the use of 
debt. This hypothesis has been empirically confirmed by MacKie-Mason (1990). In contrast 
to earlier empirical work on the DeAngelo-Masulis hypothesis that largely failed to identify 
tax effects,
10  MacKie-Mason does not use the debt-asset ratio as the endogenous variable, but 
explains the propensity of U.S. firms to issue bonds or new equity on the basis of a probit 
analysis. While this approach, together with other modifications, led to significant effects that 
                                                                                                                                                         
 
9 Along with corporate taxes, personal taxes are often changed as well, so that the variation of the corporate tax 
rate only leads to limited effects on the financing incentives.  
10 See, e.g., Ang and Peterson (1986), Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984), Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989), 
Long and Malitz (1985), Marsh (1982), and Titman and Wessels (1988).   11
are in line with theoretical expectations, the empirical results fail to provide evidence on the 
effect of taxation on the optimum debt-equity ratio.
11  
 
4.2 Studies with cross-section variation in national nominal tax rates  
A natural approach to identify tax effects is to use the debt-asset ratio as an 
endogenous variable and explain it by variations in the nominal corporate tax rate. To 
overcome the obvious problem that in a given year all corporations may be subject to the 
same tax rate, Gordon and Lee (2001) exploit the fact that small firms in the U.S. enjoy a 
lower corporate tax rate. They find a significant influence of the instrumented tax rate on 
financial policy, using a difference-in-difference approach. The results show that large firms 
generally have a lower debt ratio than small firms. At the same time, this debt difference is 
smaller in years in which large firms are subject to a higher corporate tax rate. They conclude 
that a 10-percentage-point increase in the corporate tax rate may increase the debt-asset ratio 
by some 3.5 percentage points.  
A further study by Graham (1999) also tries to explain the debt-asset ratio, but uses 
market values for debt and equity (instead of book values). The influence of the corporate tax 
on the debt-asset ratio is identified by using tax rate variations across U.S. states as well as 
firm-specific loss carryforwards and other firm characteristics. The pooled cross-section 
analysis from 1980 to 1994 (65,429 firm-years) yields the expected positive effects of the tax 
rate on the debt-asset ratio. The estimates imply that an increase of 10 percentage points in the 
national corporate tax rate causes an increase of 1 to 2 percentage points of corporate debt. 
Besides the statutory tax rate, Graham also uses federal tax rates. In a pooled estimation, a 
marginal coefficient of 0.24 results, while a fixed-effects estimation produces a coefficient of 
                                                 
11 In a similar vein, Alworth and Arachi (2001, p. 375) conclude, when interpreting their own results from 
MacKie-Mason-type regressions, "…since the estimates relate to changes in company indebtedness […] the 
results do not provide a guidance to the impact of taxes on the debt/equity ratio. If one is to assess alternative tax 
policies on both company decisions and tax revenues it is important to be able to arrive at a quantitative estimate 
on stock variables."   12
0.46. According to this latter figure, an increase of 10 percentage points in the tax rate would 
cause a relatively large increase in the debt-asset ratio, by 4.6 percentage points.
12 
 
4.3. Studies with variations in international tax rates 
The limited cross-section variation in corporate taxes has also been overcome by 
building on samples of subsidiaries operating in different host countries. Altshuler and 
Grubert (2003) estimate the host country’s corporate tax rate for some 6,000 U.S. subsidiaries 
abroad.  The statistics of income from the IRS, which include industries in all sectors 
(including the financial sector), are used as the database. Affiliates in high-tax countries are 
significantly more financed with debt than affiliates in low-tax countries. The estimated 
coefficients suggest that an increase of 10 percentage points in the corporate tax rate in the 
host country, depending on the empirical model, increases the debt/asset ratio by an amount in 
the range of 1.3 to 3.9 percentage points.
  Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004) also look into 
corporate financing of U.S. affiliates abroad. They use inquiries of the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis that enable the authors to run panel regressions (fixed effects). According to their 
results, a 10-percentage-point increase of the corporate tax rate leads to a 2.5-percentage-point 
increase of the debt ratio. One-fourth of this effect arises from the increase of intrafirm debt, 
and three-fourths comes from the increase of debt from third parties (outside debt holders). 
Similar magnitudes of the tax effects on borrowing have been found by Huizinga, Laeven, 
and Nicodème (2008).  
The capital structure of German affiliates abroad is analyzed by Mintz and 
Weichenrieder (2005) using panel data and fixed-effects models. For a sample of corporations 
that are wholly owned by their respective German parents, a linear regression of the host 
country’s tax rate on the debt ratio of German affiliates yields a marginal effect of 0.44: a 10-
percentage-point increase in the foreign tax rate causes an increase in the debt ratio of 4.4 
                                                 
12 The paper provides no information on whether the F-statistic is significant for the firm fixed effects.    13
percentage points. Allowing for a nonlinear relation, the marginal effect increases to 0.57. 
Including partly owned subsidiaries in the sample reduces the coefficients. In this case, the 
estimated marginal effect of the linear specification is 0.3, and that of the nonlinear 
specification 0.41. In contrast to U.S. studies, a large fraction of the financing flexibility of 
German affiliates results from the change of intrafirm credits.
13  
 
5. Calculating the efficiency costs of the distorted capital structure  
While for quite some time tax effects on corporate financing decisions have been 
disputed, from today’s point of view, empirical studies reveal a measurable, albeit moderate, 
effect on the capital structure. Studies that measure a linear effect on the debt ratio suggest 
that an increase of 10 percentage points in the corporate tax rate increases the debt-asset ratio 
by 1.4 to 4.6 percentage points. So what efficiency costs can be expected on the basis of these 
estimates? So far, the literature has been silent on this, and we should emphasize that quite 
heroic assumptions are needed to arrive at the specific values provided below.  
•  We assume that all costs of a distorted financing structure accrue to the corporation, 
meaning that these costs cannot be shifted to creditors or third parties.  
•  Corporations are identical, so that it is adequate to look at one representative 
corporation.  
•  The representative corporation maximizes its value according to the fiscal and 
nonfiscal costs, as described in Section 3. 
•  Corporate investment decisions are assumed to be fixed, and only the question of the 
financing of the capital stock is yet to be decided on. It is only this distortion that is 
singled out.  
                                                                                                                                                          
   14
•  The costs of a distorted capital structure are supposed to be quadratic and increasing in 
the deviation of the optimal debt-asset ratio B* in the absence of taxes from the actual 
ratio B° with taxation. The costs only depend on the absolute value of the deviation, 
not on its sign.  
•  All costs of a distorted capital structure that are realized by the corporation are real 
costs. That is, there are no corresponding rents accruing to outsiders, which might 
compensate for the cost to the corporation. 
 
Given these assumptions, we can take equation (11) as a starting point to derive the 
size of the marginal (nontax) cost Ψ′ if a corporation deviates from the optimal debt ratio 
because of tax considerations.
14
  Figure 1 illustrates the information that is necessary to 
evaluate the efficiency costs if debt is tax-preferred. In the top part of the diagram the 
quadratic cost function  Ψ (B° −  B*) is depicted, leading to a linear marginal-cost curve in the 
bottom part. Since the capital stock is normalized to one, the actual debt level B° also 
identifies the debt ratio. According to equation (11) these marginal costs equal i((1 – tp)/[(1 – 
c)(1 – tu)] − 1) in an inner financial equilibrium. The efficiency costs (Ψ) are given by the 
triangle B*cB° and can be calculated as 
(16)   | * | 1


























                                                                                                                                                         
13 Ramb and Weichenrieder (2005) failed to find evidence for the influence of the home country of the parent 
firm on the debt ratio of German subsidiaries. Very small home-country effects have been identified by 
Huizinga, Leaven, and Nicodème (2008). 
14 Here, we concentrate on the constellation of case A in Section 3. Empirically, it is much more common that 
retained earnings are tax-preferred over new issues than vice versa. 











To arrive at the cost Ψ, we obviously need the difference B* – B° that is triggered by 
taxation. If we define  
 (17)   u dt dB/ ≡ γ ,  
then the empirical estimations presented in Section 4 suggest 0.14 ≤ γ ≤ 0.46. This allows for 
a calculation of the costs Ψ using the formula:  
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It should be noted that a change in the corporate tax rate according to equation (11) 
has a marginal effect on the debt ratio B° that depends on the level of the personal income 
taxes. However, only unconditional estimations of γ are available, which do not consider the 
levels of tp or c. In a similar vein, the assumption of a linear relation between B° and tu is not 
necessarily plausible and is due to the limitations of the empirical results. Indeed, the 
quadratic cost function Ψ = (1/2) · a ·(B° - B*)
2, a > 0, yields a convex relation between B° 
and tu. 
Allowing for these simplifications, Table 1a illustrates for several values of γ how a 
negative value of Δtu would influence the cost Ψ when we start from financial neutrality with 
tp = tu , c = 0, and go to tu = tp + Δtu , keeping tax rates other than the corporate rate constant. 
This corresponds with the situation in many important industrial countries where the 
corporate tax rate falls short of the top personal income tax rate (Fuest, Huber, and Nielsen, 
2002). More precisely, the table presents the current efficiency cost as a fraction of the 
nominal interest rate. If we think in terms of an infinite-lived investment and use the interest 
rate for discounting, this also reflects the total present value of the excess burden associated 
with one unit of investment.  
 
Table 1a: Illustrative values for Ψ/i; Δtu <0 
 
Starting point tp, tu = 40% 
γ    0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Δtu    −0.02 −0.05 −0.1 −0.2  −0.3
Ψ/i    0.005 0.012 0.021 0.038 0.050
Starting point tp, tu = 30% 
γ    0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Δtu    −0.02 −0.05 −0.1 −0.2  −0.3
Ψ/i    0.004 0.010 0.019 0.033 0.045
Starting point tp, tu = 30% 
γ    0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Δtu    −0.02 −0.05 −0.1 −0.2  −0.3
Ψ/i    0.003 0.007 0.013 0.022 0.030
Starting point tp, tu = 30% 
γ    0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Δtu    −0.02 −0.05 −0.1 −0.2  −0.3
Ψ/i    0.006 0.013 0.025 0.044 0.060  17
 
 
It is striking that the deadweight loss in Table 1a is not a quadratic function of Δtu. 
This is due to the fact that Δtu does not equal the height of the Harberger triangle B*cB°. This 
is rather given by i((1 − tp) /[(1 − c)(1 − tu)] −1). Because of the bracket term, the calculated 
size of the Harberger triangle is a convex function of tu. For Δtu <0 this leads to a depressant 
effect on the size of the deadweight loss. The reverse effect results in the case Δtu > 0. This 
case is consistent with the standard assumption in the U.S. literature that the tax system favors 
leverage, and it is presented in Table 1b. While the calculated efficiency losses are 
comparable to those of Table 1a for moderate distortions and |Δtu  | ≤ 0.1, much larger 
magnitudes are calculated if |Δtu | is large.  
Taking the intermediate assumption that |Δtu | = 0.1 and picking an interest rate of 5%, 
then our calculations indicate that in current values the excess burden amounts to some 5 to 
15 basis points or 0.05% to 0.15% of the invested capital.   
Table 1b: Illustrative values for Ψ/i; Δtu > 0 
 
Starting point tp, tu = 40% 
γ    0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Δtu    0.02 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3
Ψ/i    0.005 0.014 0.030 0.075 0.150
Starting point tp, tu = 30% 
γ    0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Δtu    0.02 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3
Ψ/i    0.004 0.012 0.025 0.060 0.113
Starting point tp, tu = 30% 
γ    0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Δtu    0.02 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3
Ψ/i    0.003 0.008 0.017 0.040 0.075
Starting point tp, tu = 30% 
γ    0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Δtu    0.02 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3
Ψ/i    0.006 0.015 0.033 0.080 0.150
 
 
To reiterate, the above calculations  imply some stark simplifications, and it is 
worthwhile to discuss possible modifications. One possibility is that a distorted financial 
structure induces external costs that are not borne by the corporation. For example, higher   18
corporate debt ratios may induce a higher macroeconomic volatility, the cost of which is not 
priced in a corporation's individual financial cost. This may lead to a situation in which the 
overall cost of a tax preference for debt is higher than indicated by the value of Ψ.  
On the other hand, externalities may lead to distortions in the financial structure even 
in the absence of taxation. In this case tax distortions may even improve welfare. Fuest, 
Huber, and Nielsen (2002) argue that if the market treats issuance of new equity as a signal 
for low profitability, then it may be desirable to reduce the managers' preference for debt by 
making debt tax-disadvantaged.   
Another issue that has been abstracted from is firm heterogeneity. If corporations have 
different flexibilities in reacting to tax incentives with their financial structure, then applying 
the average marginal effects to all firms may underestimate the total welfare loss. This firm 
heterogeneity may also imply that different firms may have different cost of capital. For 
example, a tax preference for debt may be most valuable for companies that are able to use a 
large amount of debt. This in turn has implications for the investment incentives that have 
been kept out of the picture above.  
 
6. Conclusions and Outlook 
The search for the determinants of corporate capital structure is central to finance 
research, and scholarly articles abound. The present paper has analyzed capital structure 
choice from a public finance perspective. In particular, it has attempted to evaluate the 
efficiency costs of a distorted financial structure. Knowledge about these costs is 
economically relevant, because the aim of financial neutrality may conflict with other political 
objectives, like implementing a progressive tax system. International tax competition with its 
moderating effect on corporate tax rates may also raise the question of the costs of 
differentiating personal and corporate taxes.   19
The calculations that have been suggested in this paper imply that a difference 
between the corporate tax and the personal income tax  equal to 10 percentage points may 
lead to yearly efficiency costs per unit of total assets that lie between 1.3 and 3.3 percent of 
the nominal interest rate.   
While this is a first attempt to attach numbers to the cost of financial distortions, it 
should be emphasized that strong assumptions had to be employed to do so. Among other 
things, we abstracted from external costs of a distorted capital structure and assumed that all 
costs are internalized by corporations and the total amount of investment is kept constant. We 
made use of empirical estimates of the marginal effects of the corporate tax rate on the debt-
asset ratio by assuming that this marginal effect is constant, although a constant marginal 
effect is not necessarily plausible. Even if one ignores these problems, as done in this article, 
there are only a limited number of empirical studies that analyze the correlation between the 
corporate tax rate and the debt ratio, and the spread in results is considerable. Finally, many 
studies depend on a comparison of international corporations that operate among different 
national corporate taxes. Whether the parameter values that have been derived from these 
studies are representative for national corporations deserves further investigation.   
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